In an ad-hoc network, intermediate nodes on a communication path are expected to forward packets of other nodes so that the mobile nodes can communicate beyond their wireless transmission range. However, because wireless mobile nodes are usually constrained by limited power and computation resources, a selfish node may be unwilling to spend its resources in forwarding packets which are not of its direct interest, even though it expects other nodes to forward its packets to the destination. It has been shown that the presence of such selfish nodes degrades the overall performance of a non-cooperative ad hoc network.
Introduction
can successfully identify selfish nodes and punish them accordingly.
The incentive schemes for packet forwarding in the literature basically fall into two categories, namely, reputation-based schemes and pricing-based schemes.
Reputation-based schemes utilize reputation in routing [8] and/or enforcing punishment [1] . However, the existing reputation-based schemes suffer from lack of effective mechanisms to measure and propagate reputation. Without quantitative and objective ways to measure reputation, and secure ways to propagate reputation, a reputation-based incentive scheme would not serve the purpose of stimulating packet forwarding, since reputation can be easily manipulated by selfish nodes in this case. Hence, this paper proposes a quantity to objectively measure reputation of a node, and a secure mechanism to propagate reputation, with the aim of resolving the drawbacks of the existing reputation-based incentive schemes.
Pricing-based schemes [2, 5, 16] treat packet forwarding as a service that can be priced, and introduce some form of virtual currency to regulate the packet-forwarding relationships among different nodes. However, these schemes require either tamper-resistant hardware 2 [2] or virtual banks (trust authorities) that all parties can trust [5, 16] . In the case where tamper-resistant hardware is used, if a node (say, node A) sends much less traffic than another node (say, node B), node A may drop most of the packets of node B without losing anything, since node A need not earn more money than necessary to support the small volume of its own traffic. In the case where a trust authority or virtual bank is required, it needs assistance from a fixed communication infrastructure to implement the incentive schemes, which is not applicable for a pure ad hoc network. In contrast to these, our SORI architecture is based on reputation and hence does not require tamper-resistant hardware or trust authorities; in addition, under our scheme, each node are motivated to maintain a good reputation in order to keep a desirable quality of its network connectivity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify assumptions made in this paper. Under these assumptions, we first develop our basic scheme in Section 3 and then improve the basic scheme with security enhancements described in Section 4. In Section 5, we show simulation results to demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme. Section 6 discusses the related work. In Section 7, we conclude the paper.
Assumptions
In this paper, we make the following assumptions.
1. The nodes in an ad hoc network under our consideration are non-cooperative in packet forwarding, that is, a node is not willing to forward packets of other nodes unless it can benefit from the packet forwarding. If nodes are cooperative, e.g., in military ad hoc networks, there is no need to use incentive mechanisms.
2. There is no conspiracy among nodes.
Broadcast transmission:
A packet can be received by all the neighbors of the transmitting node (within its transmission range) because of the broadcast nature of the wireless medium.
4. Desire to communicate: All the participating nodes have the desire to communicate with some others.
Invariant identity:
No node changes its identity during its life time. This assumption is reasonable since changing identity of a node results in unreachability of packets destined to the node, which violates the previous assumption "desire to communicate".
Selfish but not malicious:
A node may be selfish in terms of conservation of power and computing resources, but not malicious, which means that it will not try something that could be more expensive in consuming energy and computing resources than cooperating in packet forwarding. In other words, a node will not do something that cannot conserve its computation/energy resource. For example, a node will not sabotage the network by denial-of-service attacks, which consumes a great deal of its energy.
Promiscuous mode:
Each node operates in a promiscuous mode, i.e., each node listens to every packet transmitted by its neighbors even if the packet is not intended for the node; and each node is able to determine who transmits the packet. The promiscuous mode is (typically) required for ad hoc networks unless deterministic medium access control such as time division multiple access is employed; without listening to every packet transmitted by its neighbors, a node may miss some packets destined to it.
Basic Scheme
This section presents the basic scheme of our incentive mechanism, under the assumptions listed in Section 2. The basic scheme consists of three components, namely, neighbor monitoring, reputation propagation, and punishment, which are described as follows.
Neighbor Monitoring
In our scheme, neighbor monitoring is used to collect information about the packet-forwarding behavior of the neighbors. Due to the promiscuous mode that we assume, a node is capable of overhearing the transmissions of its neighbors. With this capability, a mobile node N can maintain a neighbor node list (denoted by NNL N ) which contains all of its neighbor nodes that node N learns of by overhearing. In addition, node N keeps track of two numbers, for each of its neighbor (denoted by X), as below.
• RF N (X) (Request-for-Forwarding): the total number of packets that node N has transmitted to X for forwarding.
• HF N (X) (Has-Forwarded): the total number of packets that have been forwarded by X and noticed by N.
The two numbers are updated by the following rules. When node N sends a packet to node X for forwarding, the counter RF N (X) is increased by one. Then N listens to the wireless channel and check whether node X forwards the packet as expected. If N detects that X has forwarded the packet before a preset time-out expires, the counter HF N (X) is increased by one.
Given RF N (X) and HF N (X), node N can create a record called local evaluation record (denoted by LER N (X)), for the neighbor node X. The record LER N (X) consists of two entries, that is, G N (X) and C N (X), where
and C N (X) is a metric called confidence, used to describe how confident node N is for its judgement on the reputation of node X. In our scheme, we set C N (X) = RF N (X); that is, the more packets transmitted to X for forwarding, the better estimation about how well the neighbor X does forwarding.
Reputation Propagation
With the fore-mentioned neighbor monitoring, a node could build a record of the reputation of its neighboring nodes. However, our initial experimental result shows that actions (dropping selfish nodes' packets) solely based on one's own observation of its neighbors cannot effectively punish selfish nodes. To address this problem, reputation propagation is employed to have neighbors share the reputation information of other nodes, so that a selfish node will be punished by all of its neighbors (who share the reputation information about its misbehavior) instead of just the ones who get hurt by the selfish node. The reputation propagation works as follows:
1. Each node N periodically updates its LER N (X) for each neighbor node X based on the changes of RF N (X) and HF N (X), and it broadcasts the updated record to its neighborhood if G N (X) has been significantly changed.
2. Node N uses its LER N (X) and LER i (X) (where i is in the NNL N ) to calculate its overall evaluation record of X (denoted by OER N (X)) as below:
where λ N (i) is the credibility that node i has earned from the perspective of node N.
In current scheme, we choose λ N (i) = G N (i), especially, λ N (N) = 1, and λ N (i) = 0 if RF N (i) = 0, which means a node would not have any credit from N if it has not been requested by N to forward any packet.
Punishment
With the reputation measure OER N (X) obtained, node N can punish its neighbor X by probabilistic dropping as follows. If the OER N (X) is lower than a preset threshold, node N takes punishment action by probabilistically dropping the packets originated from X. The probability of dropping is
where q = 1−OER N (X) and 0 < δ < 1 is the margin introduced for the following consideration: a dropping action could be occasionally triggered by some phenomena such as collision, rather than selfishness. Without the margin, two nodes may keep increasing the dropping probability and consequently fall into a retaliation situation. The margin is designed to help well-behaving nodes avoid this situation by treating each other a little bit more generously.
To summarize, this section presents our basic incentive scheme, which consists of neighbor monitoring, reputation propagation, and punishment. Neighbor monitoring is to collect information about misbehavior of neighbors and objectively quantify reputation of neighbors. Reputation propagation is aimed at sharing information among neighboring nodes to make the reputation measure more accurate (from statistical perspective, i.e., the weighted averaging in (1) helps removing dependence of the reputation measure on location and node identity). Punishment is to encourage packet forwarding and discipline selfish nodes.
The basic scheme is vulnerable to some tricks played by selfish nodes and we improve it by security enhancements presented in section 4.
Remark 1 Objective quantification of reputation
• The reputation of a node is objectively measured based on the packet forwarding ratio of the node, and it directly affects the service the node can obtain from other nodes.
• 
Security Enhancement
This section presents security enhancements to fix the vulnerabilities of the basic scheme, which could be potentially exploited by selfish nodes.
A selfish node may play the following tricks in order to benefit itself without being detected by the basic scheme:
Problem 1 (P1): Impersonate a node that is near the selfish node and has a good reputation, in order to send its own packets (using other's identity).
Problem 2 (P2):
Impersonate a node with a good reputation, in order to broadcast fake observation information in order to boost its reputation calculated by other nodes.
Problem 3 (P3):
Manipulate the routing information during routing path discovery in order to have the data packets get around the selfish node itself so that the selfish node can avoid the responsibility for forwarding other's data packets without being detected. Here, we assume the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol [6] is used.
To address the first two problems, we propose an identification and authentication method based on a one-way-hash chain, which is presented in Section 4.1. To mitigate the third problem, we design a secure dynamic routing protocol, which is described in Section 4.2.
One-way-hash Chain for Identification and Authentication
To address the problems P1 and P2, a natural solution is to use identification and authentication since with identification and authentication, well-behaving nodes can be identified (and rewarded) and misbehaving nodes can also be identified (and punished). To design an effective identification and authentication scheme, one needs to consider the unique property of ad hoc networks, which is different from wired networks and wireless cellular networks.
This property of ad hoc networks is no fixed infrastructure. Due to this feature, our design for identification and authentication does not rely on any infrastructure to help the communication or management of mobile nodes. Note that this design principle is different from those assuming the existence of an authentication infrastructure such as a public key infrastructure (PKI) or a "friendship" infrastructure as in [1] .
Based on the above design principle, we propose an authentication mechanism based on a one-way-hash chain [7] as below. Node N gets its identity, denoted by ID N , by choosing a random number r N and recursively applying a pseudo-random function h on r N by k times,
which is recursively obtained by
When N is joining an ad-hoc network, it broadcasts its identity ID N and all its neighbors receive this identity and put this identity into their NNLs. The neighbors will use this identity to authenticate messages originated or forwarded by this node (identified by ID N )
thereafter.
Next, we describe our procedure of message authentication. Our procedure of authentication is the same as that suggested by Perrig et al. [13] for broadcast authentication. Node N partitions the time into equal intervals and assigns the i-th interval with a key (denoted
in the one-way-hash chain. The messages sent in an interval will be accompanied by a message authentication code (MAC) which is computed with the corresponding key K and the message M as the input, denoted by MAC(K, M). For instance, the content of packet P i sent in the i-th interval is
where M i is the message to be sent in the i-th interval; the key K i is obtained from
where f is the second pseudo-random function 4 and
the key disclosure delay (for example, in the (i − d)-th interval, the message is authenticated by key K i−d , and key K i−d will be disclosed in the i-th interval). Once receivers receive a packet, they check if the key used for the MAC is already disclosed. If the key has not been disclosed, they cache the message and will check its authenticity at the time when the K i is disclosed; otherwise, they discard the packet because the key was disclosed before they received the packet and the MAC could be potentially forged. In addition, a packet with an invalid MAC will be discarded.
Note that a misbehaving node N will not generate a new random numberr N and the associated one-way-hash chain to get rid of its bad reputation (assuming node N generated a random number r N previously for authentication). This is because the identity ID N of node N is already set to H k (r N ) and changing ID N to H k (r N ) violates the assumption of invariant identity (see Section 2).
The key feature of our authentication scheme is that the one-way-hash chains are designed to 'identify' mobile nodes; specifically, the identity of a node N is associated with the keys that are used to 'authenticate' packets, i.e., ID N = H k (r N ). In contrast to this, most existing schemes separate the identification of mobile nodes from message authentication;
and hence they require a PKI or other trust management systems to identify mobile nodes, which are usually not practical for a non-cooperative ad-hoc network.
Our authentication scheme makes it difficult for a selfish node which has a bad reputation to send out its packets or broadcast fake observation information to affect the others calculation of its reputation by impersonating a node with a good reputation. This is because the MAC is computationally difficult to forge without the key of that node. Moreover, our design is efficient because the authentication is done with a one-way-hash function which is computationally much cheaper than the digital signature used in many other schemes. This is particularly desirable since most mobile devices are constrained by energy and computation resource.
Like any other security measure, our scheme also pays some cost. A cost is that our scheme requires time synchronization to make a time-slotted system. However, the synchronization can be loose and there are a number of simple ways to achieve synchronization as suggested by [13] .
Secure Dynamic Routing Protocol
To mitigate the problem P3, we enhance the DSR routing protocol by a security measure.
We first briefly describe the DSR protocol [6] . The DSR is an on-demand source routing protocol. The key component of the DSR is a route discovery protocol, which is invoked by a source node S when node S does not know any path from node S to the destination D. It works as below. First, node S initiates a route request packet rreq and broadcasts it to its neighbors. Then, the neighbors in turn append their own address to packet rreq and broadcast it. This process continues until packet rreq reaches the destination D. Since packet rreq contains a complete path from node S to node D when it reaches node D, node D can send a route request reply packet rrep (containing the path information) back to node S through the reverse path. Once node S receives packet rrep, the path from node S to node D (contained in packet rrep) is confirmed. Then, the packets to node D can be forwarded through this identified path.
We start with discussion about the vulnerabilities of our basic scheme in Section 3. First, we are not worried about that a selfish node may not be cooperative on forwarding route request packets since doing so will damage its reputation. What is of our concern is that a selfish node may play some tricks when forwarding route request rreq and route request reply rrep. For example, a selfish node may provide a source node with a fake path, which does not include the selfish node and hence looks shorter than the valid path that includes the selfish node. Since usually the shortest path would be picked, the shorter path not containing the selfish node is selected; hence, the selfish node avoids the responsibility of forwarding data packets and this cheating is not detected! This kind of misbehavior would severely degrade the performance of the network [10] since the packets transmitted along the invalid path are unlikely to reach the destination.
To fake a path not including a selfish node N, node N may take the following actions. we assume node N j+1 does not check whether node N is its neighbor and hence node N j+1 will broadcast rrep 2 and node N will receive rrep 2 even though node N is not on the path as specified by rrep 2 . In this way, source S obtains a (fake) shorter path that does not include node N. Therefore, the selfish node N will not be asked to forward the packets from node S to node D.
Alternatively, node N may fake an invalid path of the same length as that of the valid one, by replacing its own ID by a spoofed ID; in so doing, it may end up with a path
Hence, the probability that the valid path (containing node N) would be selected is reduced by 50%. To address Case 2, we borrow the idea originated from the associativity-based routing (ABR) [15] . Under the ABR protocol, every node periodically transmits beacons indicating its existence to its neighbors, and also receives beacons from its neighbors. Each node maintains a table, each entry of which registers the number of beacons the node has heard from one of its neighbors; different entry of the table corresponds to different neighbor.
These numbers are used in the ABR to measure the node's connectivity relationship (a.k.a. associativity) with its neighbors. Under the ABR, the associativity measure is used to select the most reliable path. Different from the ABR, we utilize the associativity measure to identify 'inactive' neighbors, which could be faked by selfish nodes. A neighbor X of node N is regarded as being active if node N periodically receives the beacons from node X;
otherwise, node X is regarded as being inactive. Because of transmission collision in the shared channel, there is no guarantee that a node N receives every transmitted beacon from its neighbors. So, a practical way of deciding being active is as below: node N marks a neighbor X as being active if the number of successfully received beacons from node X during a certain time period exceeds a pre-determined threshold.
Assuming a time-slotted system as in Section 4.1, with the above tag of being active or inactive, and the one-way-hash-chain based authentication scheme described in Section 4.1,
we propose an enhanced route discovery protocol for the DSR as below. Under our secure routing protocol, it is unlikely for a selfish node N to play tricks to make the source node pick a fake (shorter) path. A possible trick is that node N periodically broadcasts the beacons on behalf of its neighbor, say node X, making node X appear to be the neighbor of node Y , which is a neighber of node N but is two hops away from node X.
However, sending these fake beacons may cost more energy resource than forwarding others' packets.
In our scheme, beaconing is required and may incur quite a bit overhead; however, if an ABR-type of routing protocol is used, beaconing is readily available and we do not have to pay an extra cost. To reduce the energy consumed by beaconing, we can increase the beaconing interval; or a node does not need to send beacons unless it has not communicated for a certain time period, and a node N marks its neighbor X as being active if node N learns that there are certain amount of communication from node X during the time period.
Simulation Results
In this section, we implement our basic incentive scheme on a simulator and evaluate its performance under various settings. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme in identifying selfish nodes and punish them accordingly. This section is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes the simulation setting, while Section 5.2
illustrates the performance of our scheme.
Simulation Setting
Our incentive scheme is implemented on ns-2 [11] . We simulate a wireless ad-hoc network with 50 mobile nodes randomly deployed in an area of 670 × 670 square meters. We use the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 as the medium access control layer protocol, and dynamic source routing (DSR) as the routing protocol. The radio transmission range for each node is 250 meters and the transmission data rate is 2 Mbits/s. The physical layer model is either the free space or the two-ray propagation model [14] , depending on the separation distance between the transmit antenna and the receive antenna. The height of both the transmit antenna and the receive antenna is 1.5 meters.
The random waypoint mobility model [4] is used to generate the moving direction, the speed and the pause duration of each node. The node speed is uniformly distributed between 0 and 20 m/s, and the pause duration is exponentially distributed with an expectation of 600 seconds.
Among the 50 nodes, 5 nodes are randomly selected and assigned as selfish nodes. A selfish node in our simulation probabilistically drops packets from other nodes unless it is the destination of the packet.
For each simulation, we first set the total number of connection, denoted by N conn . Then, we randomly generate N conn source-destination pairs; the generated source-destination pairs may be duplicated, that is, the same source-destination pair may have multiple connections.
Each connection lasts for 10 simulated seconds. Once a connection is terminated at the end of the 10th simulated second, a new source-destination pair is randomly generated and a connection is set up between the newly generated source-destination pair. Since the sourcedestination pairs are randomly generated (each node is equally likely to be selected to form a pair), the traffic is uniformly distributed among different nodes. In addition, the constant bit rate (CBR) traffic model in ns-2 is employed for all the connections. Each simulation is executed for 1000 simulated seconds. We set the threshold δ in Eq. (2) to 0.1, for all the simulations.
Next, we evaluate the performance of our scheme.
Performance Evaluation
We organize this section as below. In Sections 5.2.1 through 5.2.3, we investigate how our incentive scheme performs under various number of connections, different data-rate of CBR traffic, and various dropping probability of selfish nodes, respectively. Section 5.2.4 shows the overhead incurred by our incentive scheme. 
Performance under Various Number of Connections
This experiment is to show the performance of our incentive scheme under various number of connections N conn . In this experiment, a selfish node drops all the packets from other nodes unless it is the source or the destination of the packet; the data rate of all the CBR connections is fixed to 1 packet/sec. Fig. 1 plots the average throughput of a well-behaving/selfish node vs. the total number of connections N conn . Note that for each simulation run, the value of N conn is fixed. In the figure, the average throughput of a well-behaving node is obtained by 1) summing up the number of packets correctly received by all well-behaving nodes, 2) dividing this sum by the total number of well-behaving nodes, and 3) dividing the result by the total simulation time, i.e., 1000 seconds. Similarly, the average throughput of a selfish node is obtained by 1) summing up the number of packets correctly received by all selfish nodes, 2) dividing this sum by the total number of selfish nodes, and 3) dividing the result by the total simulation time.
As depicted in Fig. 1 , a well-behaving node achieves significantly higher average throughput than that of a selfish node; on average, a selfish node suffers about 50% throughput reduction, as compared to a well-behaving node. This shows that our scheme can identify a 
Performance under Various Data-rate
This experiment is to show the performance of our incentive scheme under various datarate of CBR traffic. In this experiment, a selfish node drops all the packets from other nodes unless it is the source or the destination of the packet. For each simulation, the data rate of all the CBR connections is fixed; but for different simulation, the data rate of CBR connections changes from 1 to 10 packets/sec. For all the simulations, we set the total number of connections N conn = 10. Fig. 2 shows the average throughput of a well-behaving/selfish node vs. the data-rate of a CBR connection. As shown in Fig. 2 , a well-behaving node achieves higher average throughput than that of a selfish node; however, the difference (in terms of percentage) between the throughput of a well-behaving node and that of a selfish node reduces with the increase of the data-rate. The reason for this reduction is the following: as the datarate increases, the probability of transmission collision increases, which results in higher probability of mis-calculation of objective reputation (refer to Remark 1). 
Performance under Various Dropping Probability of Selfish Nodes
This experiment is to show the performance of our incentive scheme under various dropping probability of selfish nodes. In this experiment, each selfish node probabilistically drops the packets from other nodes unless it is the source or the destination of the packet. The dropping probability is the same for all selfish nodes and varies from 10% to 100% in different simulations. That is, for each simulation, the dropping probability of selfish nodes is fixed; but for different simulation, the dropping probability changes from 10% to 100%. For all the simulations, we set the total number of connections N conn = 10 and fix the data rate of all the CBR connections at 1 packet/sec. Fig. 3 plots the average throughput of a well-behaving/selfish node vs. the dropping probability of selfish nodes. It can be seen that as the dropping probability of selfish nodes increases, the gap between the throughput of a well-behaving node and that of a selfish node increases. Hence, our incentive scheme can not only distinguish the selfish nodes from the well-behaving nodes, but also impose a punishment proportional to the severity of the selfish behavior. This shows the effectiveness of our incentive scheme. Fig. 3 also shows that the average throughput of a well-behaving node decreases with the increase of the dropping probability of selfish nodes. This is because the loss probability of a packet destined to a well-behaving node increases with the dropping probability of selfish nodes.
From Fig. 3 , one may notice that the average throughput of a selfish node is not zero when the dropping probability of selfish nodes is 100%. The reason is the following. When the dropping probability of a selfish node X is 100%, the overall evaluation record OER N (X) at node N is zero. Hence, q = 1 − OER N (X) = 1 and p = q − δ = 0.9 since we set δ in Eq. (2) to be 0.1. Therefore, the average throughput of a selfish node should 1 − p = 10% of the transmission rate. From Fig. 3 , we see the average throughput of a selfish node is about 0.1 packet/sec at a dropping probability of 100%, which is 10% of the transmission rate at 1 packet/sec. This validates our calculation.
One may argue that the average throughput of a selfish node should be zero when the dropping probability of the selfish node is 100%. This is the special case when δ = 0, i.e., zero tolerance about others' selfishness. As mentioned in Section 3.2, a dropping action could be occasionally triggered by some phenomena such as collision, rather than selfishness. If δ = 0, two nodes may keep increasing the dropping probability and consequently fall into a retaliation situation. Letting δ > 0 can help well-behaving nodes avoid this situation by treating each other a little bit more generously. Of course, the cost of non-zero δ is that a selfish node with a dropping probability of 100% can still have a throughput of δ × α (where α is its transmission rate), instead of zero; however, this throughput δ × α is small and a selfish node has to waste a good deal of energy to retransmit the dropped packets many times in order for the packets to get through to the destination. So, the node may even save energy if it cooperates in forwarding others' packets! An open problem is how to tune δ so as to achieve the desirable trade-off between the throughput of a selfish node and the robustness of network stability (due to generosity in punishment). We leave this for future study.
Overhead Incurred by Our Incentive Scheme
This experiment is to show the overhead incurred by our incentive scheme, as compared to the scheme that does not use our incentive mechanisms. In this experiment, a selfish node drops all the packets from other nodes unless it is the source or the destination of the packet; the data rate of all the CBR connections is fixed to 1 packet/sec. We do simulations for two schemes: one is our incentive scheme, and the other (which we call benchmark scheme)
does not take any of the three actions, i.e., neighbor monitoring, propagating reputation, and punishing selfish nodes. under the benchmark scheme (without incentive mechanisms); here, since the benchmark scheme does not distinguish the selfish nodes from the well-behaving nodes, the average throughput of a selfish node should be the same as that of a well-behaving nodes, from the statistical perspective. The solid line in the figure shows the average throughput of a well-behaving node under our incentive scheme. It can be observed that the throughput of a well-behaving node under our incentive scheme is reduced, as compared to that under the benchmark scheme. This throughput reduction is what we call overhead. The reason for this throughput reduction is two-fold: first, reputation propagation consumes bandwidth and therefore reduces the net throughput; second, collision may cause mis-calculation of the reputation measure, leading to improper punishment on the well-behaving nodes. Fig. 4 shows that the overhead incurred by our scheme is not more than 8%, which is small. Just because of this small overhead, we are able to propagate reputation, identify selfish nodes and punish them according to the severity of their misbehavior. It can also be seen that the overhead increases with the total number of connections N conn . This is because the larger N conn , the high probability of collision, which results in higher probability of reputation mis-calculation and hence larger overhead.
Related Work
As mentioned in Section 1, the existing incentive schemes for packet forwarding can be classified into two categories, namely, reputation-based schemes and pricing-based schemes, the representative work of which are discussed as below. 
Reputation-based Schemes
One of the pioneering work on reputation-based incentive schemes is Ref. [8] , where Marti et al. proposed two mechanisms called watchdog and pathrater, for non-cooperative ad-hoc networks. The watchdog identifies misbehaving nodes while the pathrater selects routes that avoid the identified misbehaving nodes. Their results showed that these two mechanisms can achieve an acceptable total throughput even with a large percentage of misbehaving nodes. However, how to punish a selfish node was not addressed in their work. Therefore, under their framework, selfish nodes are not discouraged and well-behaving nodes may be unfairly made busier. To remedy this, Buchegger and Le Boudec [1] proposed a punishmentbased protocol called CONFIDANT. The nice feature of this protocol is that the nodes called friends can share the reputation information about other nodes, and punish the misbehaving nodes that have bad reputation. Friends play a crucial role in the protocol; however, how to win friends is not clear. In addition, encryption and digital signatures are used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the communications among friends, but distributing (public) keys in ad-hoc networks is a challenging problem and is not addressed in their work.
In contrast to the above work, this paper proposed a secure reputation-based incentive architecture, in which not only a punishment mechanism is employed to discourage misbehavior, but also a set of secure protocols for identification, authentication, and routing are specifically designed for 'non-cooperative' ad-hoc networks.
Pricing-based Schemes
Buttyan and Hubaux [2] proposed one of the early pricing-based incentive schemes. In their scheme, a virtual currency called nuglet is used as payments for packet forwarding. Later on, they [3] proposed another scheme based on credit counter. The nice feature of the two schemes is that they do not possess the limitation that many reputation-based schemes (excluding the SORI architecture in this paper) have: reputation may be falsified by selfish nodes. However, both of the schemes in [2, 3] require a tamper-resistant hardware module and assume that each node in the ad hoc network has almost the same amount of packets to forward. Moreover, the schemes introduce much management communication overhead to maintain the virtual currency flows.
Jakobsson et al. [5] proposed a nice scheme, which does not use tamper-resistant hardware. This scheme is designed for multihop cellular networks. Under the scheme, a micropayment system suggested by Micali and Rivest [9] is employed, and the operator of the base stations plays the trusted role of banks in the micro-payment system. A disadvantage of this scheme is much communication overhead incurred due to managing the micro-payment system. For example, each time before a packet is forwarded at a node N, node N needs to send a request message to its neighbor and an acknowledgement from its neighbor is expected. To make things worse, if a packet reaches a node X and none of the neighbors of X is willing to forward the packet, the packet will be dropped and the previous forwarding efforts will be wasted. 7 In the scheme, whenever a base station receives a packet, the base station must contact the home network of the packet's originator to verify the message authentication code, which also introduces much communication overhead.
Pricing-based schemes require either tamper-resistant hardware [2] or virtual banks (trust authorities) that all parties can trust [5, 16] . As discussed in Section 1, these requirements impose serious limitations on the applicability of pricing-based schemes to non-cooperative ad hoc networks. In contrast, our incentive architecture is based on reputation and a belief that each node would like to stay in the network with a desirable quality of connectivity (punishment will seriously degrade the quality of connectivity of an identified selfish node).
Our solution is comprehensive in the sense that it integrates reputation measurement, reputation propagation, punishment, node identification, message authentication, and secure routing. Each component in our incentive architecture is designed with careful consideration of the unique features of non-cooperative ad-hoc networks.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose a Secure and Objective Reputation-based Incentive (SORI) architecture to encourage packet forwarding and discipline selfish behavior in a non-cooperative ad hoc network. The unique features of our SORI architecture are the following.
1. The reputation of a node is quantified by objective measures (through neighbor monitoring).
2. The propagation of reputation is secured by a one-way-hash-chain based authentication scheme, which is computationally efficient and eliminates the need for a PKI or other forms of authentication infrastructures which are usually not practical for noncooperative ad-hoc networks.
3. The reputation of a node is only propagated to its neighbors, which greatly reduces communication overhead as compared to the schemes that maintain reputation globally.
4. Routing is effectively secured with the aid of beaconing and the one-way-hash-chain based authentication scheme.
With the reputation measure obtained by the SORI architecture, we are able to design a punishment scheme to penalize selfish nodes. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme can successfully identify selfish nodes and punish them accordingly.
